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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970s and 1980s, after the Supreme Court of the
United States once again approved state death penalty laws, Jus-
tices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall uniformly dis-
sented from each decision of the Court in which a death penalty
was upheld.1 Indeed, for the last fifteen or so years that they
served on the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented
from the denial of certiorari in every one of the hundreds of cases
* Bruce P. Merenstein is a partner in Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP's Phila-
delphia office. He is a member of the firm's Appellate Practice Group and also is an adjunct
professor of appellate advocacy at the Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law.
** Paul H. Titus is counsel in Schnader's Pittsburgh office. Mr. Titus has handled
hundreds of matters at the trial and appellate levels in his more than 40 years of practicing
law. He collaborated with Mr. Merenstein, who is the principal author of this article.
1. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 674 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282, 304 (1977) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("Adhering to our views
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by




in which a petitioner sought to challenge his or her death penalty. 2
Similarly, just months before he left the Court in 1994, Justice
Harry Blackmun dissented from a denial of certiorari in a death
penalty case, famously declaring that "[flrom this day forward, I
no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."
3
By contrast, no recent member of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court regularly dissented from the Court's affirmance of death
sentences or argued that the death penalty was, in all cases, un-
constitutional. 4 Thus, it is no surprise that during his almost two
decades serving on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, former Chief
Justice Ralph J. Cappy authored a number of majority opinions
upholding the imposition of a death sentence and frequently
joined other justices' opinions upholding the death penalty.5 Yet,
in a small collection of notable cases, Chief Justice Cappy dis-
sented from the Court's opinion upholding a death sentence. In
each of these cases, the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion reflected
a careful fidelity to statutory authority for imposition of a death
sentence or strict adherence to procedural regularity in imposition
of society's most serious punishment. More specifically, these dis-
senting opinions addressed the need to follow the precise statutory
scheme set forth for imposition of the death penalty and the de-
fendant's right to a fair procedure before such a severe penalty can
be rendered and upheld by the state's highest court. In the dis-
cussion that follows, we will parse eight of these dissenting opin-
ions to explicate the importance of the former Chief Justice's
death penalty jurisprudence in dissent.
2. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1282 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari); Boggs v. Muncy, 497 U.S. 1043 (1990) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Alvord v. Florida, 428 U.S. 923 (1976) (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
3. Callns v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
4. Section 13 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the infliction of
"cruel punishments." PA. CONST. art. I, § 13. In Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument "that the imposition of the death penalty is
inevitably 'cruel punishment' under Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." 454
A.2d 937, 967 (Pa. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827
A 2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v.
Rollins, 580 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1990).
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COMMONWEALTH V. COPENHEFER (1991)
David Copenhefer was convicted and sentenced to death in 1989
for kidnapping and murdering Sally Weiner. 6 The jury based the
death sentence on its finding of two aggravating circumstances
and no mitigating circumstances. 7 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court unanimously rejected Copenhefer's arguments for
vacatur of his conviction, including "the novel claim that state ac-
quisition of documents he mistakenly thought he had deleted from
his computer was an impermissible intrusion on his right of pri-
vacy."8 However, the Court split 4-3 on an issue affecting Copen-
hefer's death sentence: whether the trial court erred in refusing
Copenhefer's request to charge the jury that Copenhefer's lack of a
prior record constituted a mitigating circumstance as a matter of
law.9 The majority summarily rejected Copenhefer's argument. 1°
Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Nix and Justice Zappala,
dissented "vigorously."" Quoting the death penalty statute, Jus-
tice Cappy noted that the statute "expressly provides that
'[m]itigating circumstances shall include the following: (1) The
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convic-
tions."1 2 Because the Commonwealth and defense had stipulated
that Copenhefer did not have a prior criminal record, "the jury
should have been instructed that they were bound to find at least
one mitigating circumstance existed."13 Focusing on the specific
language of the statute, Justice Cappy argued "that the General
Assembly intended just what it said in enacting § 9711(e)(1);
namely, that a sentencing jury must consider the absence of a
prior record as a mitigating circumstance where such an objective
circumstance is present."' 4 Because the parties had stipulated the
6. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Pa. 1991), abrogated by Com-
monwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001).
7. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d. at 1358. Under Pennsylvania law, a death sentence must be
imposed "if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circum-
stances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)
(2007).
8. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1354.
9. Id. at 1358.
10. Id. at 1358-61 (quoting at length the trial court's jury instructions and finding no
error).
11. Id. at 1366 (Cappy, J., dissenting). In our discussion of the cases during Chief
Justice Cappy's time on the Court as an Associate Justice (1990-2003), we refer to him as
"Justice Cappy."
12. Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(1) (1980)).




existence of one of the mitigating circumstances that the jury must
consider, the trial court erred, in Justice Cappy's view, in not in-
structing the jury that they had to consider this mitigating cir-
cumstance and weigh it against any aggravating circumstances. 15
The Copenhefer decision has an interesting postscript (or two).
Ten years after the decision, the Court reversed course in Com-
monwealth v. Rizzuto,16 a unanimous decision authored by Justice
Cappy, and held that "where a mitigating circumstance is pre-
sented to the jury by stipulation, the jury is required by law to
find that mitigating factor." 7 Thus, Justice Cappy's position even-
tually prevailed-but too late to help Copenhefer.
Two months after Rizzuto was decided, Copenhefer filed his
third Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition, alleging that
he was entitled to relief on the basis of the new rule announced in
Rizzuto.'8 The PCRA court dismissed Copenhefer's petition as
untimely and, in another 4-3 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed.' 9 This time, Chief Justice Cappy joined the major-
ity, which held that Copenhefer was "not entitled to retroactive
application of Rizzuto.
''20
While the original Copenhefer decision was issued barely a year
after Chief Justice Cappy joined the Court, the later Copenhefer
decision-in which the Court held that Copenhefer could not bene-
fit from the rule Chief Justice Cappy advocated in dissent in the
original case and that the Court eventually adopted-came just
four days before the Chief Justice left the Court. The Copenhefer
cases thus act as bookends on Chief Justice Cappy's death penalty
jurisprudence.
COMMONWEALTH V. BAKER (1992)
Lee Baker was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting
death of William Gambrell during a robbery.2' Baker, who was
nineteen years old at the time, had a history of at least seven ju-
venile adjudications prior to the murder, including a robbery, an
aggravated assault, and five burglaries. 22 The jury found that this
15. Id. at 1366-67.
16. 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Free-
man, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
17. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1089 (Pa. 2001).
18. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 2007).
19. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d at 648-50.
20. Id. at 650.
21. Commonwealth v. Baker, 614 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa. 1992).
22. Baker, 614 A.2d at 665.
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prior record constituted an aggravating circumstance, and after
weighing it and two other aggravating circumstances against the
two mitigating circumstances, rendered a sentence of death.23 On
the case's appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the major-
ity affirmed the conviction and sentence in a 4-3 decision.
24
Among Baker's arguments for overturning his death sentence
was that a juvenile adjudication did not constitute a "conviction"
under the death penalty statute and, therefore, could not be con-
sidered by the jury in determining whether the defendant had a
significant history of violent felony convictions. 25 At the time of
Baker's conviction, the statute governing juvenile adjudications
specifically provided that an "order of disposition or other adjudi-
cation in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of
crime."26 The statute further provided that a juvenile disposition
"may not be used against [the child] in any proceeding in any
court other than a subsequent juvenile hearing, whether before or
after reaching majority," other than as part of a pre-sentence in-
vestigation and report following conviction of a felony.27 Relying
on an almost 35-year-old precedent in a non-capital case involving
a different version of the juvenile adjudication statute, the Court
rejected Baker's argument.
28
Justice Cappy dissented. Focusing once again on the plain lan-
guage of the statute, Justice Cappy noted that the "death penalty
statute provides a precise formula for narrowly considering those
cases in which the extreme penalty of death should be imposed."
29
Moreover, the Court was "required to interpret penal statutes in
the strictest sense, giving any benefit of liberal interpretation to
the accused. '30 Reading the "actual words" of the statute, the er-
ror of allowing the prosecutor to present to the sentencing jury
evidence of Baker's prior juvenile adjudications was obvious:
"Under our statutes, the terms 'felony convictions' and 'adjudica-
tion of delinquency' are not synonymous."
31
23. Id.'at 665 & n.2.
24. Id. at 666. The lineup of justices in the majority and dissent was the same as in the
first Copenhefer case.
25. Id. at 675.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 6354(a) (1976) (amended 1995) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at § 6354(b)(2).
28. Baker, 614 A.2d at 676 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrikson v. Myers, 144
A.2d 367, 371 (Pa. 1958)).
29. Id. at 682 (Cappy, J., dissenting).




Justice Cappy went on to explain that the sentencing guidelines
and juvenile adjudications statute strictly limited the situations in
which prior juvenile adjudications can be considered-and that
those situations do not include capital sentencing determinations
by juries.32 Rather, the legislature "purposely excluded juvenile
adjudications from the consideration of the jury in death penalty
cases." 33  Like his dissenting opinion in Copenhefer, Justice
Cappy's dissent in Baker focused on the plain statutory language
in arguing that a capital defendant should not be sentenced to
death based on a jury's consideration of inadequate or improper
evidence-in this case, juvenile adjudications of delinquency.
COMMONWEALTH V. YOUNG (1993)
Joseph Louis Young was convicted in 1987 of two counts of
murder (and other charges) for the stabbing deaths of Ismail and
Lois al Faruqui.34 Three years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction but unanimously reversed his death
sentence because of a defect in the verdict slip at the original
trial.35 At the time of Young's crime, as well as the time of his
original trial, the death penalty statute provided that, whenever
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a conviction but va-
cated a death sentence, the Court must remand the case for impo-
sition of an automatic life sentence. 36 However, during the pend-
ency of Young's appeal, the legislature amended the statute to
provide that, except in certain limited circumstances, the Court
should remand a case for a new capital sentencing hearing when it
had upheld a conviction but vacated a death sentence.37 Because
the comment following the amended statute "expressly stated that
the amendment applied to cases then on appeal," the Court re-
manded Young's case for a new sentencing hearing after vacating
his death sentence in 1990.38
On remand, Young was again sentenced to death for each mur-
der conviction.39 On appeal the second time, Young argued that
application of the amended statute to his case violated the ex post
32. Id. at 682-83.
33. Baker, 614 A.2d at 683 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
34. Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313, 1315 (Pa. 1993).
35. Young, 637 A.2d at 1315.
36. Id. at 1316 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h) (1983)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1315.
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facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Court re-
jected the argument, holding that the potential punishment did
not change from the time Young committed his crime until the
time he was finally sentenced; in both cases, he faced the possibil-
ity of a death sentence for first-degree murder.40 The Court also
rejected the argument that the amendment deprived Young "of
any substantial right protected by the Ex Post Facto Clause."
41
Only Justice Cappy dissented. Justice Cappy disagreed with
the majority's view that the amendment caused only a procedural
change not implicating the Ex Post Facto Clause.42 In his view,
"[w]hat has happened in the instant case is that the potential
maximum sentence on remand has been increased from life to
death . . .and the procedure dictated by the General Assembly
(remand for resentencing) has remained exactly the same."43 Per-
haps emphasizing his view that something much more substantive
than a change in procedure was at work in Young's case, Justice
Cappy noted that, had the Court heard Young's original appeal
(filed four months before the legislative change) "more expedi-
tiously," his case would have been remanded for automatic imposi-
tion of a life sentence. 44 "To my mind," Justice Cappy wrote, "it is
unjust, to put it mildly, to hold that appellant must receive the
death penalty because this Court did not act more quickly in con-
sidering his appeal."
45
COMMONWEALTH V. FAHY (1994)
Henry Fahy was convicted of murder and other charges for the
killing and torture of 12-year-old Nicky Caserta. 46 Fahy's convic-
tion was affirmed on direct appeal, and he eventually filed a coun-
seled PCRA petition raising a single issue: his trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's failure to define
"torture" for the jury before it considered (and found) an aggravat-
ing circumstance of committing a homicide by means of torture.
47
Four years after Fahy's trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had held that a trial court must instruct a jury that, in order to
40. Young, 637 A.2d at 1317.
41. Id. at 1318.
42. Id. at 1324-25 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1325 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987)).
44. Id. at 1324 n.1.
45. Young, 637 A.2d at 1324 n.1.
46. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 645 A.2d 199, 200 (Pa. 1994).
47. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 200-01.
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find the aggravating factor of homicide by torture, the jury must
find that the defendant had the "specific intent to inflict pain, suf-
fering or both pain and suffering."48 Fahy argued that this ruling
demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting a
jury instruction that defined torture, but the Supreme Court re-
jected this argument.49 The Court noted that "it is difficult to
fathom how trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting an in-
struction regarding a term which this very Court had at the time
of trial found to be commonly understood."50
The Court also rejected Fahy's argument that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding the
definition of torture "because, pursuant to any conceivable defini-
tion of the term, Nicky Caserta was tortured to death."51 To sup-
port its conclusion, the majority recited in graphic detail the facts
of Nicky Caserta's death.52 The Court concluded that the jury had
ample facts before it "to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Fahy] intended to torture his victim as well as to kill her."53 The
Court then held that Fahy had failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the omission of a definition of torture, because,
given the "overwhelming evidence" of his guilt, he had not shown
how the outcome of his case would have been different if a defini-
tion had been given.
54
Justice Zappala dissented on the ground that a "manifest injus-
tice results from the majority permitting [Fahy's] sentence of
death to stand when the same would be vacated if it arose on di-
rect appeal today."55 Justice Cappy dissented for a different rea-
son: the PCRA trial court never addressed Fahy's contention that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction
regarding the definition of torture.56 Justice Cappy viewed the
majority opinion as resting on the conclusion that Fahy could not
establish the prejudice component of his ineffectiveness claim, but
"the fact that this Court may have determined that the evidence
presented was sufficient to support a finding of torture is a red
48. Id. at 201 n.8 (citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, 523 A.2d 728, 737 (Pa. 1987)).
49. Id. at 202-03.
50. Id. at 203.
51. Id. at 201.
52. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 201-02 & n.9.
53. Id. at 203.
54. Id. at 204.
55. Id. at 206 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 207-08 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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herring."57 According to Justice Cappy, because the test for preju-
dice was whether a jury, not the Fahy Court, might not have
found that the defendant committed torture or would have
weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently
if a definition had been provided, the Court could not review
Fahy's ineffectiveness claim until he was "given a hearing at
which he may present facts to establish the three prongs of an in-
effectiveness claim. 58
Significantly, Justice Cappy disagreed with Justice Zappala
that the severity of the deach sentence warranted a departure
from the general rule that "counsel cannot be found ineffective for
failing to anticipate changes in the law."59 Thus, unlike Justice
Zappala, Justice Cappy did not believe that Fahy was entitled to
relief because of a decision that came four years after his trial; he
simply believed that Fahy was entitled to the hearing that the
Supreme Court had ordered when it stayed his execution two
years earlier.60 This basic procedural right was absent; thus, re-
gardless of what the justices on the Court thought about Fahy's
guilt or the heinousness of his crime, a PCRA hearing was re-
quired.
COMMONWEALTH V. BUEHL (1995)
Roger Buehl was convicted of a triple murder and sentenced to
death for each murder; on direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentences.61 Buehl
eventually filed a counseled PCRA petition, raising, among other
issues, ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court after the PCRA trial court rejected Buehl's claims, a
plurality of the Court (three of the participating six justices)
agreed with Buehl that his "trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to request a cautionary instruction regarding [his prior] crimes
because it cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that but
for this omission the outcome of [Buehl's] trial would not have
been different."62 However, the plurality ultimately affirmed the
trial court's denial of PCRA relief on the ground that "the PCRA
57. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 208.
58. Id. at 208-09 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
59. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 209 n.1.
60. Id. at 208-09.
61. Commonwealth v. Buehl, 658 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. 1995) (plurality opinion), abro-
gated by Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. 1999).
62. Buehl, 658 A.2d at 778-79.
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renders more stringent the prejudice requirement which must be
satisfied before relief can be granted"-and Buehl did not meet
that more stringent standard.
63
Chief Justice Nix concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with
the plurality's contention that prejudice under the PCRA was
more stringent than prejudice generally, but he agreed that PCRA
relief should be denied because he did not believe that counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding
Bueh's prior crimes.
64
Justice Cappy (joined by Justice Flaherty) dissented on the
grounds that, in enacting the PCRA, the legislature could not con-
stitutionally create a higher standard for ineffective assistance
than the existing one, and that even if it could, it did not do so.
65
First, Justice Cappy noted, the United States Supreme Court and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had established the proper tests
for determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel had been violated, and the state
legislature could not create a higher standard. 66 Second, relying
on language in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Strickland v. Washington,67 Justice Cappy argued that it was
"logically impossible" to impose a higher standard than the exist-
ing one, which already focused on the reliability of a verdict ren-
dered without the assistance of effective counsel.68
Justice Cappy believed that the plurality actually was applying
a sufficiency of the evidence or harmless error test, neither of
which would be appropriate. 69 In his view, a sufficiency of the evi-
dence test had nothing to do with determining whether a trial er-
ror harmed the defendant (the purpose of the prejudice prong of
ineffectiveness), and the harmless error analysis was equally il-
logical: "Once there is a determination that the defendant suf-
63. Id. at 777, 779-80. At the time, the PCRA required "a defendant to prove that
counsel's ineffectiveness 'so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Id. at 777 (quoting 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (1988)).
64. Id. at 782-83 (Nix, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 783-84 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Nix effectively joined in Justice
Cappy's reasoning, but not in the result Justice Cappy would have reached in Buehl's case.
See id. at 782 (Nix, C.J., concurring in judgment) ("I am in agreement with the criticisms
expressed in Mr. Justice Cappy's dissenting opinion concerning the plurality's interpreta-
tion of the test for ineffectiveness of counsel...").
66. Id. at 784 (Cappy, J., dissenting) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)).
67. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
68. Buehl, 658 A.2d at 784 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87).
69_ Id. at 785.
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fered prejudice under the Pierce[70] test which could lead to a dif-
ferent result (verdict)[,] it would not make sense to essentially
'back up' and argue that the defendant was in fact not prejudiced
under a harmless error analysis."71 Thus, Justice Cappy would
have held "that that the verbiage set forth in [the PCRA] is by
constitutional mandate and logical application, nothing more than
a recitation of the Pierce standard of prejudice."
72
As with his dissent in Copenhefer, Justice Cappy would eventu-
ally see his dissenting position in Buehl prevail. Almost four
years after Buehl was decided, the Court expressly rejected the
plurality's view and held that "the PCRA does not impose a more
stringent prejudice requirement than that applicable to direct ap-
peals."7
3
COMMONWEALTH V. HANNIBAL (2000)
Sheldon Hannibal and a co-defendant were convicted of first-
degree murder for the beating and shooting of Peter LaCourt.
74
Hannibal was sentenced to death while his co-defendant received
a life sentence. 75 On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Hannibal argued that the jury instructions erroneously allowed
the jury to convict him of first-degree murder based solely on his
alleged accomplice's specific intent to kill.76 The trial court had
instructed the jury that if it found "that a defendant intentionally
used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body, you may
regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you
may, if you choose, infer that the defendant, his accomplice or co-
conspirator had the specific intent to kill."
77
A plurality of the Court (again, three of the six justices partici-
pating in the decision) rejected Hannibal's argument, finding that
the instructions were the equivalent of telling the jury that it
"may find the accomplice guilty if it finds that the defendant and
his accomplice (or you may think of him as a co-conspirator) acted
70. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987). Justice Cappy noted that the
test set forth in Pierce was the same as that set forth in Strickland. See Buehl, 658 A.2d at
785 n.4 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
71. Buehl, 658 A.2d at 785 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 786.
73. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. 1999). Only one of the Court's
seven justices disagreed with this conclusion. See id. at 337-39 (Castille, J., concurring).
74. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1267 & n.6 (Pa. 2000).
75. Hannibal, 753 A.2d at 1267.
76. Id. at 1271.
77. Id. at 1270-71 (emphasis added).
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with specific intent to kill and malice."78 Thus, the plurality held,
the instructions correctly "referred to the need to consider whether
each individual in the case possessed the requisite specific intent
to kill."79 Justice Nigro concurred in the judgment, finding that
any error in the trial court's instructions was harmless.8 0
Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Zappala, dissented.8' Justice
Cappy noted that he would agree with the plurality's conclusion if
the trial court had given the instruction as rewritten by the major-
ity.8 2 But, "this is not the instruction that was given. Rather, it is
a concoction derived from the majority's hopes that the jury was
privy to the same book of grammar that it had at its disposal. '8 3
Thus, because the actual instruction given by the trial court "in-
formed the jury that it could find [Hannibal] guilty of first degree
murder even if only his accomplice or co-conspirator, rather than
[Hannibal] himself, had the specific intent to kill," it ran afoul of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent requiring the jury to find
that each defendant "harbored the specific intent to kill."84
As in Fahy, the important point for Justice Cappy was that the
procedure leading to conviction for first-degree murder and impo-
sition of a death sentence must provide every assurance that the
jury truly intended to impose society's most severe sanction on the
defendant. Without a proper jury instruction on an element of the
crime, the Court could not be confident that this was the case.
COMMONWEALTH V. RICE (2002)
Timothy Rice was convicted at a non-jury trial for the murder of
Bernard Jackson and James Jefferson in a Philadelphia bar, and a
jury then sentenced Rice to death for each murder.8 5 Rice chal-
lenged his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, includ-
ing that the statutory scheme allowing the jury to consider victim
impact evidence was unconstitutional and that "the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury on how it should consider [victim
78. Id. at 1271.
79. Id.
80. Hannibal, 753 A.2d at 1276 (Nigro, J., concurring in the judgment).
81. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1277.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994) and Commonwealth
v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1982)).
85. Commonwealth v. Rice, 795 A.2d 340, 344-45 (Pa. 2002) (plurality opinion), over-
ruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
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impact] evidence" during the sentencing phase of his trial. 86 The
year before Rice's case came to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the Court had rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Commonwealth's statutory provisions allowing consideration of
victim impact evidence and the procedures for admitting such evi-
dence, and thus, the Court summarily rejected Rice's challenge to
the statute.
87
Rice's jury instruction argument was not so easily dismissed. In
fact, a plurality of the Court (three of the seven justices) concluded
that "the trial court failed to present the law accurately to the
jury."88 Pennsylvania's death penalty statute allows a jury to con-
sider victim impact evidence if it finds any aggravating circum-
stance and any mitigating circumstance.8 9 However, the trial
court had instructed the jury to consider victim impact evidence
only if it found an aggravating circumstance and the catch-all
mitigating circumstance, and to consider the victim impact evi-
dence only in determining how much weight to afford the catch-all
mitigating circumstance. 90 Yet, because the plurality found the
erroneous instruction to be more restrictive than was permitted
under Pennsylvania law, it held that the error was harmless and
Rice was not entitled to a new sentencing trial.9 1 Justice Saylor
concurred in the result, without writing an opinion, and Justice
Nigro concurred in the judgment, on the ground that the instruc-
tion was not erroneous.92
Justice Cappy dissented (as did Chief Justice Zappala). Justice
Cappy noted that the Pennsylvania statute "permits a jury to con-
sider victim impact evidence as part of the general deliberative
process in reaching a conclusion on the moral culpability of a par-
ticular defendant."93 The trial court's instruction, however, was
modeled after New Jersey's victim impact provision, which "en-
abled consideration of victim impact testimony as linked to testi-
mony relevant to the character of the defendant."94 Unlike the
plurality, Justice Cappy did not find the given instruction to be
86. Rice, 795 A.2d at 350-51.
87. Id. at 351 (citing Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001) and Common-
wealth v. Natividad, 773 A.2d 167 (Pa. 2001)).
88. Id. at 353.
89. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(2) (1999)).
90. Id. at 353.
91. Rice, 795 A.2d at 354.
92. Id. at 359 (Saylor, J., concurring in the result); id. at 363-64 (Nigro, J., concurring
in the judgment).
93. Id. at 362 (Cappy, J., dissenting) (citing Means, 773 A.2d at 156, 159).
94. Id. at 361 (citing State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996)).
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more restrictive in terms of the victim impact evidence it allowed
the jury to consider than what was permitted by Pennsylvania
law.95 Nor did he view the instruction as offering a greater benefit
to the defendant than a correct instruction.96 Rather, he viewed it
as different from what was permitted under the Pennsylvania
statute.97 Thus, he posited that the erroneous instruction was not
harmless, and the Court should have remanded the case to the
trial court for a new penalty hearing. 98
COMMONWEALTH V. BANKS (2007)
In one of Pennsylvania's most notorious murder cases, George
Banks was convicted in 1983 of twelve counts of first-degree mur-
der and one count of third-degree murder for a shooting spree in
which most of the victims were his children and their mothers. 99
Banks was given the death sentence for each of his first-degree
murder convictions, but in 2005, after two rounds of state appeals
and two trips to the United States Supreme Court, the Court of
Common Pleas for Luzerne County declared Banks not competent
to be executed. 100 On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the Court reversed in an opinion issued just days before Chief Jus-
tice Cappy retired from the bench.
Before addressing the issues raised by the Commonwealth in its
appeal, the majority recited the lengthy procedural history that
followed the United States Supreme Court's second ruling on the
case in 2004: In December 2004, after Banks's mother had filed a
"next friend" petition on his behalf, the trial court denied that pe-
tition for want of jurisdiction, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court then assumed plenary jurisdiction over Banks's case.10 The
Supreme Court ordered the trial court to hold a competency hear-
ing expeditiously to determine Banks's competency to be executed
and "to determine whether [Banks] possessed the mental capacity
to initiate clemency proceedings or to designate someone to initi-
ate them on his behalf."'0 2 Over the next year, the Supreme Court
issued a series of "directives" to the trial court, which, according to
95. Id. at 362-63.
96. Rice, 795 A.2d at 363.
97. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(a)(2) (1999)).
98. Id.
99. Commonwealth v. Banks, 943 A.2d 230, 231 & n.2 (Pa. 2007).
100. Banks, 943 A.2d at 231-32, 236.




the majority, were necessitated by the trial court's delay in carry-
ing out the Supreme Court's original December 2004 order. 10 3
During this time, the Commonwealth's and Banks's attorneys bat-
tled over the Commonwealth's request to have its psychiatrist ex-
amine Banks and interview correctional personnel outside the
presence of Banks's counsel. 10 4 The trial court sided with Banks
and, when the competency hearing finally took place in January
2006, Banks "presented three expert witnesses who opined that he
lacked a rational and factual understanding of his death sentences
and the reasons for and implications of the same," in response to
which the Commonwealth produced "no evidence."'10 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court following the trial court's find-
ing that Banks was not competent to be executed, the Supreme
Court held that the trial court erred in precluding the Common-
wealth's experts from examining Banks or interviewing correc-
tional personnel outside the presence of Banks's counsel. 0 6 The
Court held that there was no constitutional requirement that
counsel be present when a prisoner sentenced to death is exam-
ined by a government expert. 0 7 The Court further held that the
trial court had no authority to impose such a requirement in
Banks's case, given the narrow scope of the Supreme Court's De-
cember 2004 order, and that, in fact, the trial court had not issued
any such order requiring counsel's presence. 08 Clearly irritated
with the trial court's failure to follow its original directive, the ma-
jority closed with the command that "with the exception of sched-
uling and logistical matters, the trial court is not to be diverted by
tangential motions and assertions by counsel: this Court retains
jurisdiction over such matters. The trial court is to act expedi-
tiously in conducting the rehearing."'0 9
103. Id. at 232-34.
104. Id. at 232-36. The Commonwealth's initial expert examined Banks and interviewed
correctional personnel outside the presence of Banks's counsel. Id. at 233. As a result, the
trial court granted Banks's motion to preclude that initial expert from testifying at the
competency hearing. Id. at 235. The Commonwealth then retained a new expert, but that
expert declined to conduct the necessary interviews in the presence of defense counsel. Id.
at 235-36.
105. Banks, 943 A.2d at 236. Although the majority claimed that the Commonwealth
produced "no evidence," Chief Justice Cappy, in his dissent, indicated that the Common-
wealth presented the testimony of an expert at the competency hearing, albeit not the
expert who had examined Banks. Id. at 240 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 238 (majority opinion).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 239.
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Chief Justice Cappy dissented in an opinion joined by Justice
Baldwin. Chief Justice Cappy found, contrary to the majority,
that the trial court had required the Commonwealth (though not
in a written order) to inform defense counsel of any plan to exam-
ine Banks or interview correctional personnel so that defense
counsel could be present. 110 Because the Commonwealth failed to
comply with this order, Chief Justice Cappy believed that the trial
court was well within its discretion in precluding the Common-
wealth's experts from testifying at the competency hearing. 1 In
his view, that was the beginning and the end of the case. Indeed,
he noted, the Commonwealth had failed in its appeal to develop
the argument that the trial court erred in requiring defense coun-
sel's presence during the expert's examination of Banks.1 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court should not even have addressed the issue.
Chief Justice Cappy concluded by reviewing the trial court's com-
petency determinations and finding them to be well supported by
the evidentiary record.' 13
CONCLUSION
In the modern death penalty era,"14 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not seen the likes of Justice Thurgood Marshall or Jus-
tice William Brennan-jurists who consistently voted against the
death penalty in every single case that came before their court.
Yet, while generally voting to uphold death sentences imposed on
first-degree murder defendants in Pennsylvania, Chief Justice
Ralph Cappy carved out a small, but important, death penalty
jurisprudence in dissent during his eighteen years on the Court."15
In that jurisprudence, which, in some cases, later became the con-
trolling law of the Commonwealth, the former Chief Justice re-
110. Banks, 943 A.2d at 239 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 239-40.
113. Id. at 240-41. According to Chief Justice Cappy, "[The evidence presented estab-
lishing Banks'[s] incompetency is nothing short of overwhelming and a second competency
hearing is unwarranted." Id. at 241.
114. That is, since the Supreme Court once again approved state death penalty laws in
1976. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
115. Chief Justice Cappy also authored at least a dozen opinions in which the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court vacated either a death sentence or a capital murder conviction. In
addition, he wrote a number of concurrences in capital cases in which he agreed with the
Court's ultimate ruling (which, in some cases, consisted of an overturning of a death sen-
tence or conviction), but differed with the majority's reasoning or application of precedent.
These majority and concurring opinions do not offer as clear a lens through which to view
and analyze Chief Justice Cappy's death penalty jurisprudence, and thus we leave their
consideration for another day or other scholars.
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minded his colleagues, lower court judges, and practitioners of the
importance of strictly construing the death penalty statute in fa-
vor of capital defendants and of affording such defendants the pro-
cedural rights they are due. Whatever one's views may be of the
morality, constitutionality, or benefits of the most serious and ir-
revocable criminal sanction, the former Chief Justice is to be cred-
ited for taking a stand in these important cases by reiterating the
importance of fidelity to statutory authority and commitment to
procedural protections in death penalty cases.
POSTSCRIPT
This article was written before the untimely passing of our for-
mer Chief Justice. I was pleased to work on it with Bruce Meren-
stein, who was the principal author of this piece, because of my
great admiration and respect for Ralph Cappy. Those of us who
served on the Civil Procedural Rules Committee or on the Judicial
Council while he was the liaison to those committees, and who
worked with the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts on
legal matters involving the judiciary, saw Ralph Cappy at work.
The energy, enthusiasm, and dedication that he demonstrated in
his continuing efforts to improve and strengthen the entre judicial
system was inspiring. While many of us have lost a valued friend,
we have all lost a remarkable man who did much to make our
courts work better for all of the citizens of our Commonwealth.
Paul H. Titus
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